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PBSTRACT
Howthe financing of government budget deficits affects the structure
of expected asset returns depends on assets' relative substitutabilities in
investors' aggregate portfolio, and these substitutabilities in turn depend
on how investors perceive the risks associated with the respective assets'
returns.The empirical results reported in this paper, based on three different
ways of representing investors' risk perceptions, consistently indicate that
government deficit financing raises expected debt returns relative to expected
equity returns, regardless of the maturity of the government's financing.
Morespecifically, financing government deficits byissuing short-term debt
lowersthe return on long—term debt, and lowers the return on equity by even
more, relative to the return on short—term debt, Financing deficits by issuing
long-term debt raises the return on long—term debt, but lowers the return on
equity, again in comparison to the return on short-term debt.
The indicated magnitudes of these effects differ according to the
method used to represent investors' risk perceptions, but the qualitative
results are consistent throughout. Moreover, many of the indicated magnitudes
are large enough to mattereconomically.These results imply that continuing
large government deficits at full employment lead to market incentives for
individual business corporations to emphasize reliance on equity (including
retentions), and reduce reliance on debt, in comparison with the composition









ILICATIONSOF COVEPIO1ENT DEFICITS FOR
INTERESTRATES, EQUITY RETURNSANDCORPORATE FINANCING
Benjamin N. Friedman
Corporate financial officers in the United States have traditionally
regarded choices affecting their companies' debt—equity structures as
centralto the management of the modern business enterprise, and they have
also recognized the critical importance for these choices of the market
environment. The decision to issue new debt securities or new equity, and
indeed the decision to raise external funds at all or to rely on internal
equity additions, are key ways in which individual business corporations
respond to the incentives and signals provided by the financial markets.
Theseincentives,and the responses they call forth, are basic aspects of
how the financial markets steer the allocation of the economyTs scarce saving.
In a fundamental sense, this process is a large part of why an economy like
that of the United States has such highly developed capital markets in the
firstplace.
Amajor new factor affecting the U.S. financial environment in the
1980s is the need to finance federal government budget deficits far in excess
of any prior U.S. peacetime experience. Federal expenditures exceeded
federalrevenues by more than $100 billion for the first time during the
recession year 1982, and the budget gap widened to nearly $200 billion, or
6% of the nation's gross national product, as thebusiness expansion began
in1983. The limited narrowing of the deficit to about $170billion in 1984,
despite the continuing vigorouseconomic expansion, has now represented the
emergence of unprecedentedly large deficits on a high—err1oyrrnt basis as well.—2—
Prospectsfor the remainder of the 1980s depend both on the economy's
further expansion and on future legislative action, of course, but as of
the time of writing neither the Administration nor the Congress foresees
a significant shrinking of the federal deficit before 1989.1
Because of the central role of the market environment in affecting
corporate financial decisions, this dramatic change in the stance of U.S.
fiscalpolicy bears potentially significant irrlications not only for
market interest rates but also for corporate financing, and hence for the
quantity and allocation of physical capital formation undertaken by the
U.S.business sector overall. In assessing these impacts, it is essential
at the outset to judge the effects of continuing large government deficits
on the structure of interest rates and equity returns confronting individual
bi.asiness corporations. That structure of asset returns depends, in turn,
on the portfolio behavior of investors who collectively must hold whatever
securities corporations, the government, and other borrowers mayissue.
wheninvestorsare averze to bearing risk, as most investors
plausibly are, their willingness to hold different kinds of securities
depends on their assessments of the respective risks to which holding
these securities exposes them. Investors typically prefer assets that they
expect to bear higher returns when the associated risks are equivalent, but
excessive risk can lead investors to shun even assets that they expect to
bear very large returns. Similarly, investors' willingness to treat some
kinds of securities as substitutes for others in their portfolios depends on
the relationships that investors perceive among the associated risks to holding
thesesecurities as well as others. Iftwo assets expose holders to
essentiallythe same set of risks —toinflation, for example, or to the
price of some raw commodity like oil or copper —investorstypically treat—3—
thetwo as close substitutes anl allocate their portfolios accordingly.
The object of the research summarized in this paper is to determine,
on the basis of the plausible behavior of investors in the U.S. financial
markets,how theemergence of continuing large federal government deficits
athighemployment is likely to affect the market environment for corporate
financing.In particular, the specific question addressed here is how issues
ofeither short— or long—term debt, to finance the government deficit, affect
the structure of marketreturnson both debtand equity securities.
Because investors'perceptions of risks on these various assets are unobservable,
and hence must be indirectly inferred from data describing information that
investors presumably have, the approach taken here is to examine the
ansrs to this question generated by several different ways of representing
the all—ixrortant risk perceptions.
Section I briefly reviews the relationship between investors' demands
for various assets and the respective risks that they associate with these
assets. An aspect of this relationship that is of crucial importance in the
contextof the question addressed here is that not just the magnitude but
eventhe direction of the effect of government bond issues on debt and
equity returns is an empirical question, not answerable on the basis of theory
alone. Sections II, III and IV present evidence on this question based on
threedifferent methods of inferring investors' risk perceptions from
availabledata. Section V summarizes the conclusionsimplied by these three
forms of evidence, and calls attention to several important caveats.
Toanticipate, the evidence presented here consistently indicates
thatfinancing government deficits by issuing short-term debt lowers the
return on long—term debt, and lowers the return on equity by even more, in
relation to the benchmark of the return on short—term debt; and that issuing—4—
long-term debt raises the return on long—term debt, and lowers the return on
equity, again in relation to the benchmark of the return on short—term
debt. Hence either form of deficit financing alters the structure of
returns so as to render equity a more attractive form of finance from the
issuer's perspective. This conclusion emerges from all three ways of
inferring investors' risk perceptions considered here.—5 —
I.Government Debt Issues and Debt and Equity Returns
In light of the radical change in U.S. fiscal policy that occurred
at the outset of the l9SOs, it is iirortant to know what effects the
financing of government budget deficits has on the structure of asset
returns. The U.S. Government's budget deficit has become unprecedentedly
large —even on a high—employment basis —in comparison to the economy's
gross national product, to its supply of private saving, and to the ordinary
financing requirements of business corporations and households. In the
absence of a change from current tax and spending policies, this trend
appears likely to continue. In addition, for the first time ever in U.S.
peacetime experience, the federal government's outstanding debt is rising,
steadily and rapidly, in comparison to gross national product. This trend
too appears likely to continue for some time.
Ifthese trends do continue, then the amount,andprobably also the
composition, of both business and household financing will be different in
the 1980s than in previous cyclically comparable periods. From the
perspective of the balance of saving and investment, only a half-again
increase in the economy's net private saving rate would be sufficient to
accommodate government deficits of the current magnitude plus the usual
amountofprivate sector investment.2 Similarly, because the economy's
totalof government plus private sector debt outstanding has typically been
a stable multiple of gross national product, a rising government debt ratio
suggeststhatprivate sector borrowers will not be able to increase their
outstandingdebt in pace with economic growth.3
To what extent —indeed,whether —governmentdeficit financing
"crowds out"private financing1 and henceprivate capital formation, depends—6—
inthe first instance on how deficit financing affects the market returns
onprivate securities .Neithercoorations nor individuals voluntarily
bDrrowless, or issue fewer equities (or retain less earnings), out of any
innate desire to make the national accounts balance. Instead, private
financing decisions depend on incentives and disincentives provided by
market returns. Lower required rates of return (higher securities prices)
presumably encourage borrowers and equity issuers, but higher required
returns (lower securities prices) discourage private financing, changes
in the structure of relative returns for example, between debt and equity —
provideincentivesto issi more of one kind of security and less of another.
Howmarket returns respond to such developments as issues of government
debt depends, in turn, on how investors perceive the risks associated with
differentkinds of securities. For any given set of risk assessnnts
that market participants hold —includingnot just the riskiness of each
asset individually but, importantly, the set of relationships connecting the
risk on any one asset to that on any other —investorschoose what assets
to hold on the basis of the respective returns they expect various assets
to bear. e pattern of expected returns will lead investors to allocate
their portfolios in one way, while an alternative pattern of expected returns
will lead them to choose a different allocation. No one investor ever holds
all of the various assets available in the market, of course, but collectively
all investors together must allocate their aggregate portfolio in just the
composition corresponding to the assets outstanding in the market as a whole.
Under ust circumstances, only one unique pattern of expected returns will lead
allinvestorscollectively to choose exactly that allocation of their
aggregate portfolio.—7—
when the corrposition of the assets outstanding in the market
changes, therefore, the pattern of expected asset returns must change also,
shiftingto whatever configuration will induce investors collectively to
hold exactly this new composition of assets. In this way, changes in
the composition of assets outstanding —forexample, as a result of
government deficit financing —bringabout changes in the market—clearing
structureof expected asset returns. Moreover, because the economic
function of these changes in expected returns is to induce investors to change
their portfolio allocations, andbecause investors' demands for different
assets depend on their perception of the associated risks, what changes
in expected returns follow from any specific change in the composition of
outstanding assets also depends on investors' risk perceptions.
Under most circumstances, increasing the market supply of any
specific asset raises that asset's market-clearing expected return.5 If
expected returns did not change at all, investors would have to hold "too
much"of the asset with increased supply. Their efforts to "trade out of"
thatasset depress its price, and raise its subsequent expected return.
By contrast, an increase in the supply of any one asset may either
raise or lower the expected return on any other asset. As that one asset's
expected return rises, the expected returns on assets that investors regard
are close substitutes for it —forexample, government debt and high-
grade corporate debt of comparablematurity—willrise in step. If
investorsare tryingto "trade out of' the asset with increased supply, however,
theymust be trying to "trade into" sonEthing else, presumably assets that
they do not regard as close substitutes for the asset with increased supply.
Investors' effects to "trade into" such other assets bid i.theirrespective
prices, so that their respective expected returns do not rise but fall.—8—
This distinction, based on whether investors regard different
securities as close or distant substitutes! and hnce based on the risks
that investors associate with holding different assets, is crucial to the
question of whether government deficit financing "crowds out" private
capital formation. Forcing investors collectively to absorb into their
aggregate portfolio an increased SUpply of government debt presumably raises
the market-clearing expected return on government debt and on closely
similarcorporate debt instruments. Whether it raises or lowers the
expected return on equity, or the expected return on dissimilar debt
instruments, depends on the relative substitutabilities aIong debt, equity,
andother classes of assets ininvestors' portfolios.
Ifgovernment deficit financing raises the expected returns on both
debt and equity,itseconomic effect is to reduce incentives for corporate
financing in any form (unless,ofcourse,theadditional government spending
or reduced taxes increase expected profits, as would be expected when the
econon's resources are less than fully euployed) In this case deficit
financing would indeed "crowd out' corporate capital formation, and would
have uncertain effects on the composition of the remaining (smaller) amount
of corporate financing.
Alternatively, if governrrnt deficit financing raises the expected
return on debt but lowers the expected return on equity, it changes the
incentives for corporate financing in importantly different ways. In this
case, the deficit financing would give corporations a clear incentive to
substitute equity financing (including retentions) for debt financing.
Whether it would "crowd out" or "crowd in" overall corporate financing, and
hence overall corporate capital formation, depends on the relative magnitudes
of the induced movements in debt and equity returns, as well as on the relative—9—
shares of debt and equity in the resulting overall corporate financing
package.
Theevidence examined here, based on the relative substitutabilities
among short-term debt, long-term debt and equity that follow from these
three assets' respective risk properties, cannot by itself answer the
question of the extent to which the returns on all assets together rise
in response to government deficit financing. Such xrcvexnents of the overall
return structure depend not only on relative asset substitutabilities but
also on monetary policy, which lies beyond the scope of this paper.
The evidence examined here does answer the question of how the
returns on specific assets move in relation to one another, however. In
particular, the evidence presented in Sections II, III and IV below
consistently indicates that government deficit financing lowers the expected
return on equity in comparison to the expected return on either short— or
long-term debt. Morever, this relative reduction of the equity return
consistently emerges regardless of whether the government finances its
deficit by issuing short— or long—term debt.—10—
II.EvidenceBased on Sirtle Inspection of Beturns6
Individual investors,either on their own or through intermediaries,
arethe ultimateholdeof thegreatmajority of all corporate and
government securities issued in the United States. Table 1 indicates the
corrositionof the aggregate portfolio of financial assets.held directly
by U.S. householdsr as of yearend 1980, arranged according to three major
asset classes that differ from one another according to the risks associated
with holding them: Short-term debt includes all assets bearing real returns
that are risky, over a single year or calendar quarter, only because of
uncertainty about inflation. By contrast, long—term debt is risky because
of uncertainty not only about inflation but also about changes in asset prices
directly reflecting changes in market interest rates. Similarly, equity is
risky because of uncertaintyabout inflation andabout changes in stock
prices.
The first column of Table 2 shows the per annum mean nominal return
borne by each of these three classes of assets during 1960—1980, including
percentage capital gains or losses on both long—term debt andequity.7
After allowance for what proved to be capital losses on average, over two
decades in which interest rate levels were typically rising, the return on
long-term debt differed only trivially from that on short-term debt despite
a pically tward sloping yield curve. s is familiar, the return on equity
was substantially greater than on either maturity of debt.
The returns that investors ultimately care about, however, are not
these observed nominal returns but instead the corresponding returns after
both inflation and taxes. The second column of Table 2 shows the meanreal
returnson these three assets, calculated in each case by sinly subtracting
the per annum change in the consumer price index. Only equity bore a positiveTABLE 1
THREE-CLASS DISAGGREGATION OF HOUSEHOLD SECTOR FINANCIAL ASSETS
Asset Class 1980:Iv Value
Short-Term Debt (S) $1,777.0
Money
Regulated-Return Time and Saving Deposits
Corretitive-Return Time Deposits
Mney Market Fund Shares
U.S. Government Securities
OpenMarketPaper
Long-Term Debt (L) 464.3
U.S.GovernmentSecurities
State and Local Government Ct)ligaticns
Corporate and Foreign Bonds Irtgages
Equity(E) 1,215.6
Notes: Values in billions of dollars.
Detailmay not add to total because of rounding.











Mutual Fund Shares 63.7
















































































































































































































































































































































real return on average during these years. The third column of the table
shows the corresponding mean after-tax real return on each asset, calculated
byapplying the household sector's average effective marginal tax rates in
each year for interest, dividends and capita gains to the respective
nominal components of the before-tax returns.8 Only equity bore a positive
real after—tax return on average during this period. Moreover, because of
the differential tax rates applicable to interest payments and capital
gains (which, for bonds, were capital losses on average) ,themean after—
tax real return on long-tern debt was about 1% per annum more negative than
that on short-term debt.
The crucial aspect of these returns that determines the effect of
governmentdeficit financing is the set of risks investors associate with
holding various assets. These perceptions presumably bear at least some
relationship to the actual experience of asset returns over time. The heavy
solid lines in the three panels of Figure 1 plot the quarter-by-quarter
experience of the annualized after—tax real returns on these three broad
classes of assets during 1960—1980. because of the greater volatility
of long-term debt and especially equity returns, the three panels are drawn
with different scales.
Thereturn on short-term debt, plotted in the top panel of the figure,
experienced some volatility over this period, but its chief characteristic
was a general downward trend after the mid1960s,due to the taxation of
nominal rather than real interest payments. The return on long-term debt,
plotted in the middle panel, experienced much more volatility, together with
a modest overall do'vmward trend. The major bond market swings during this
period,including the "credit crunches" and subsequent rallies in 1966, 1970
and 1974, the reaction to the Federal Reserve System's new monetary policyr
L
FIGURE 1
ACTUALRETURNS AND REGRESSION-BASED FORECASTS, 1960-1980
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procedures in 1979,andthe iIrosition of credit controls in 1980, arereadily
visible.The return on equity, plotted in thebottompanel,experienced
stillmore volatility, and again a modest downward trend. The periods
major stockmarket swings are also readily visible, includingthe crash
jr1962,the response to thc 1966 and 1970 "crediL-ci rctres, andespeciIT
the response to the combination of 'credit crunch" and OPEC in 1974.
Even a sixrle eyeball—level inspection of Figure 1 immediately indicates
that the returns on these three broad classes of assets tend to move
together over time, and it is plausible to suppose thatinvestors are
awareof these comovements in at least some respects. Theupper panel of
Table 3 shows the actual variancesand covariances among these three
returns,on the same quarter—by—quarter basis plotted in Figure 1. The
variance of 11.18 shown for the return on short-term debt, for exairle,
meansthat approximately two-thirds of the time this return was within
(thesquare root of 11.18) of the —2.80% mean shown in Table 2. The
corresponding two-thirds probability ranges for the more volatile returnson
long-term debt and equity are -3.18%±14.47% and 3.13%±24.45%, respectively.
The three off—diagonal elements in this panel of the table give the analogous
pairwise covariances among the three assets.
For a given structure of variances and covariances describing investors'
perceptions of asset return risks, it is straightforward to derive from the
standard theory of risk-averse portfolio selection how investors' asset
demands respond to movements in expected asset returns, and therefore how
the pattern of expected returns must change in response to a change in the
market coirposition of assets that investors collectively must hold.9 The
lowerpanel of Table 3 summarizes the effects of government deficit financing
on the specific assumption that the variances and covariances reported above,TABLE 3
IMPLICATIONSOF SILE INSPECTION OF RETURNS






















simply calculated from the observed experience of asset returns during
1960—1980, describe investors' risk perceptions. Because the effects of
government deficit financing depend on what kind of securities the
Treasury issues,1° the table reports separate sets of effects following
from changes in the respective supplies of short— and long-term debt.
If the Treasury finances a deficit by issuing short—term debt,
the expected return on short—term debt presumably rises in comparison
to the expected returns on other assets.11 put the other way around,
in this case theexpected returns onother assets fall in comparison to
thaton short—term debt. Viichother assets' returns fall by more and
whichby less depends on the relative asset substitutabilities that
depend, in turn, on investors' risk perceptions. The results shown in
Table 3 indicate that the expected differential between the returns on long—
andshort-term debt, (which is presumably positive on the basis of past
experience) narrows by .17%, while the expected differential between the
returns on equity and short-term debt (also presumably positive) narrows
by .63%, in response to each $100 billion additional supply of short—
term government debt to be held in investors' aggregate portfolio. In other
words, if the short—term debt return is held fixed by monetary policy,
theexpected returns on long-term debt and equity fallby .17% and .63%,
respectively. The expected differential between the returns on equity
and long—term debt (also presumably positive) therefore narrows by .46%.
For a $200 billion deficit, the effects are exactly double these magnitudes.
Similarly, ifthe Theasury finances a deficit by issuing long—
term debt, the expected return on long—term debt presumably rises in
conarison to the expected returns on other assets. If the short—term
debt return isfixed, the long-term debt return then rises absolutely,
and the returns onotherassets may either rise orfall.Which other—14—
assets' returns rise and which fall again depends on relative asset
substitutabilities, and hence on investors' risk perceptions. The
results shown in Table 3 indicate that the differential between the
returns on long- and short-term debt widens by .22%, while the expected
differential between the returns on equity and short—term debt narrows
by .35%, in response to each $100 billion additional supply of long-term
term debt. In other words, if the return on short—term debt is fixed,
the expected return on long-term debt rises by .22% and the expected
return on equity falls by .35%. The expected differential between the
returns on equity and long-term debt therefore again narrows, in this case
by .57%. Once again, for a $200 billion deficit the effects would be
twice as large.
Thefinding that financing the government deficit by either short—
or long—term debt lowers the expected return on equity, in corrparison
to the expected returns on both classes of debt instruments, bears
potentiallyimportant implications for corporate financing. Nevertheless,
these estimated effects directly depend on the assumed underlying variance-
covariance structure, and simply using the observed historical pattern
ofassetreturn movements to represent investors' perceptions presumably
overstatesthe amount of uncertainty investors actually attach to their
expectations of uncertain asset returns. although the emphasis here is
on the direction rather than the magnitude of the effects of government
deficit financing, incorrectly represented risk perceptions may lead not
justto incorrect estimated magnitudes but to incorrect inferences about
directionas well. Some more satisfactory representation of investors'
risk perceptions is clearly needed.—15—
III.Evidence Based on Continually Idated Forecasting Regressions12
Thesimple procedure used in Section II to represent investors'
risk perceptions suffers from attributing to investors both too little
informationand,for someapplications, too much. Aslong as the object
ofthe analysis is todescribe investors' behavior at any time after
year—end1980, it is satisfactory to assume that investors know the
actual experience of asset return means, variances andcovariancesduring
1960-1980.By contrast, if the goal is to describe investors' behavior
on average during this period, then the procedure used in Section II
attributes to investors information which they did not have at the outset
but gradually acquired as time passed.
Thisprocedure also attributes too little information to investors
by disregarding their knowledge, at each point in time, of the most
recent realizations of security returns andthe principal determinants of
thesereturns. During the 1960-1980period the after—tax real returns
onallthreeclasses of assets considered here ethibited substantial serial
correlation,because the underlying movements of inflation, interest rates
andstock prices were themselves serially correlated.13 Whenreturnsare
seriallycorrelated over tine, informationabout the most recent actual
values is a useful ingredient in formingexpectations about returns in the
immediate future. Ignoring that information can lead to excessively large
estimates of the uncertainty surrounding theseexpectations, as is apparently
the problem with the results presented in Table 3. Table 4 presents a set of
analogous results based on a procedure that takes much more careful account
of what information investors did anddidnot have any particular time.
As of the beginning of each calendar quarter, investors presumably
kn the stated interest rates on short—term debt instruments, the currentT?BLE 4
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prices and the coupon rateson long—termdebt instruments, the current prices
and (approximately) the dividends on equities, and the relevant tax rates.
The three uncertain elements that they must forecast over the coming
quarter, in order to form expectations of the after—tax real returns on the
three broad classes of assets considered here, are inflation, the capital
gain or loss due to changing bond prices, and the capital gain or loss
due to changing stock prices.
The procedure underlying the results reported in Table 4represents
investors as forming expectations of these three uncertain return elements,
ateach point in time, by estimating a linear regression model relating
each element to past values of itself and the other two, using all data
observed through the immediately preceding period. In addition to providing
forecastvalues of the three uncertain elements for the period ahead, the
linear regression model at each point in time also directly indicates the
variancesand covariances associated with the forecasts derived in this way.
After each period elapses, investors can then repeat the same procedure,
incorporating the one new observation on inflation and on long-term debt and
equity capital gains into the data used to re—estimate the linear regression
model to make forecasts for the next period.
Given the sinple arithmetic connection between asset returns and
these underlying uncertain elements, and given investors' presund knowledge
ofthe other elementscomprisingreturns, these one-period—ahead forecasts
of inflation and the respective capital gains on long-term debt and equity
directly inply one—period-ahead forecasts of the after-tax real returns on
all three classes of assets at each point in time. Similarly, the variances
and covariances associated with the forecasts of inflation andthetwocapital
gains directly iuly the variances andcovariancesassociated with the—17—
correspondingforecasts of the three asset returns. The key advantage
of representing investors' expectations in this way, in contrast to the
simple procedure used in Section II, lies in focusing strictly on information
that investors actually had at each point intime, andin making a not
implausibleassumption about how they might have used it.
The heavy solid lines in the three panels of Figure 2 show the
quarter-by-quarter movements during 1960-1980, of the per annumratesof
inflation, capital gains on long-term debt, and capital gains on equity.
(As in Figure 1, the scales differ.) The corresponding broken lines plot
the successive one—period-ahead forecasts generated by this continually
dated linear regression procedure, for each quarter during this twenty-one
year period. For 1960:1 the three forecasts are based on the linear
regression model relating each uncertain element to a constant term, four
lagged values of itself, and four lagged values of each of the other two
uncertain elements, estimated using data for l953:II—l959:IV. For 1960:11
the procedure is the same except that the data used to estimate the linear
regression model cover l953:II-l960:I. The procedure is analogous for
subsequent periods, ending with the useofdata for 1953:11-1980:111 to
generate the one-period-ahead forecasts for l980:IV.
The degree of success achieved by these one—step—ahead forecasts
naturally varies according to the extent of the serial correlation in the
series being forecast. The sinle correlation between the actual outcomes
and the corresponding forecasts derived in this way is .88 for inflation,
.42 for long-term debt capital gains, and .23 for equity capital gains. As
is clear from the figure, this inherently backward-looking forecast procedure
enjoys the advantages, and suffers the shortcomings, of eecting the irmnediate
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The broken lines in the three panels of Figure 1 plot the successivve
one-period—ahead forecasts of the three after-tax real returns corresponding
to these forecasts of the underlying uncertain elements. Here, too, the
backward-looking procedure represents the immediate future as resembling
the immediatepast, so that the success achieved by the forecasts varies
accordingto the serial correlation in the different asset returns.The
simple correlation between the actual returns and the corresponding
forecastsis.83 for short-term debt, .51 for long-term debt, and .30
forequities. Thefinal coluirsi ofTable 2 shows the 1960—1980 means of these
one-period—ahead forecasts of the three after-tax real returns. Comparison
with the actual means shown inthe irmrdiately preceding column indicates
that,onaverage, these forecasts were somewhat too optimisticabout the
returnsonshort-term debt and equity,and somewhat too pessimistic about
the return on long—term debt.
The upper panel of Table 4 shows the variances and covariances
associated with these three asset return forecasts, on arage forl960_l980.l1
These values are much smaller than those shown in Table 3, indicatingthe
irrortanceof investors' having (and using) information about recent actual
returns. The two-thirds probability ranges for the three after-tax real
returns are for short-term debt, for long-term debt, and
for equity.
Thelower panel of Table 4 shows the irr1ied affects of government
deficit financing that follow from assuming that the variances andcovariances
shown above represent investors' perceptions of the risks associatedwith the
respective returns on these three broad classes of assets. sis to be
expected, the smaller uncertaintythanin Table 3 makes investors more
readily willing to re-allocate their portfolios in response to any given—19—
movement of expected asset returns, and therefore reduces the movement of
returns (in absolute value) needed to induce investors collectively to
accommodate a given change in the composition of assets to be held. Even
so,the estimated effects are hardly negligible. For example, for the
expected differential between the returns on equity and long-term debt
the difference between a $200 billion deficit and a balanced budget is
.54% under short-term financing and .68% under long-term financing.
In each case the direction of the implied effect shown in Table 4
is identical to that shown in Table 3.Financinggovernment deficits by
issuing short-term debt lowers the return on long-term debt, and lowers
the return on equity by even more, in comparison to the return on short—
term debt. Financing deficits by issuing long-term debt raises the
return on long-term debt, and lowers the return on equity, again in comparison
to the return on short—term debt. Under either form of deficit financing,
therefore, the return on equity falls in comparison to the return on
debt securities of either maturity.—20—
IV.Irrlications of Survey Expectations
Because the risk perceptions that determine the effects of government
deficitfinancing are inherently unobservable, so that any procedure for
representing them is necessarily only tentative, it makes sense to examine
the implications of several different representations rather than rely on
only one. inion surveys provide a further source of information about
whatinvestors thought at specific times in the past. Although theavailable
surveystypically just ask respondents to forecast specific economic variables,
without also askingfor them to state theuncertain that they associate
withtheirforecasts, it is nevertheless possible to use survey
expectations to infer perceptions of uncertainty in a variety of ways.
The upper panel of Table 5 summarizes the forecasting performance
ofthe Livingston survey of inflation and stock price expectations,
and the Goldsmith—Nagan survey of long-term interest rate expectations, by
15
showing the survey means and the corresponding actual means for 1969 :1V1980:IV.
On average, the Livingston respondents underpredicted inflation and overpredicted
stock prices bj substantial margins, while the Goldsmith-Nagan respondents
onlyndestly tderpredicted the long-term interest rate. Figure3shows
theseactual outcomes (heavy solid lines) and the corresponding survey
expectations (broken lines) for each quarter during this period. Especially
for the long-term interest rate, but to some extent for inflation and stock
prices as well, survey respondents typically did forecast the immediate
futureasifit would resemblethe immediate past. The resulting single
correlation betweenthe actual values and the corresponding survey expectations
is .74 for inflation, .84 for the long—term interest rate, and .50 for stock
prices.
Thelower panel of Table 5 shows the l969:IV-l980:iV means of theThBLE 5
MEANSURVEYEXPECTATIONS, 1969:IV—1980 :IV
Expected Asset Return Coironents
Historical Mean Survey an
Inflation 7.94% 5.87%
Aaa Bond Yield 8.95% 8.74%
S&P Stock Price Index 98.77 108.14
Inlied Expected al After—Tax Returns
Historical Mean Survey Mean
Short-Term Debt (r5) —4.86% —2.78%
Long—Term Debt (rL) -1.97 4.03
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actualafter—tax real returns on the three classes of assets considered
here, and the means of the corresponding expected returns calculated on
the basisofthe Livingston survey expectation of inflation, the long-
term debt capital gain or loss implied bytheGoldsmith-Nagan survey
expectation of the long—term interest rate, and the equity capital
gain(never a loss) implied by the Livingston survey expectation of stock
16
prices. The average underprediction of inflation implies too
optimistic an average expectation of the return to short-term debt. The
average underprediction of both inflation and the long-term interest rate
impliesan average expectation of the long-term debt return that istoo
optimistic by a wider margin. The average underprediction of inflation
and especially the average overprediction of stock prices implies an
average expectation of the equity return that is too optimistic by a still
wider margin.
Figure 4 shows the actual outcorrs (heavy solid lines) and corresponding
survey-basedexpectations (broken lines) of these three after—tax real
returns, for each quarter during1969:IV-1980:IV.17 Here itis interesting
that, for each return, the survey—based expectations are less successful
predictors than the regression—based forecasts examinedin Section III.
Thesimple correlation between the actualvalues and the correspondingsurvey-
based expectations is .62 for the short-term debt return, .26 for the long-
termdebt return, and-.13 (that is, an inverse relationship) for the equity
return.
The upper panel of Table 6 shows the variances and covariances of the
errors associated with these survey—based expectations over 1961:IV-l980:IV.
As comparison to Tables 3 and 4shows,the variance associated with the
return on short-term debt here is smaller than that itrlied by the simpleFIGURE 4
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EffecofCove rnnnt Deficit Financing (per $100 billion)
Short-TermDebt LQng-Terrn Debt
Effect on Cr —r) —.40% 1.62%
L S
Effect on (rE —r5)
—.56 —.63
Effecton (r —r) .16 2.25
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inspectionprocedure used in Section II, but larger thanthatimplied by
the regression procedure in Section III. The two-thirds probability
range for the short-term debt return is By contrast, the
respectivE variances associated with the returns on long—term debt and
equity are larger than the corresponding variances implied by either the
simple inspection procedure or theregressionprocedure. The two—thirds
probability ranges are and for the long-term debt return
and the equity return, respectively.18 Asset returns were more volatile
on average during the 1970s than they were during the l960s (and hence,
on average, during 1960—1980), but the major part of the explanation for
the larger variances shown in Table 6 is the weaker correlations between the
survey expectations and the corresponding actual outcomes)9
The lower panel of Table 6 shows the implied effects of government
deficit financing thatfollowfrom assirning that the error variances and
covariancesof the survey-based expectations represent investors'perceptions
oftherisks associated with the respective returns on these three classes
of assets.2° These large variances and covariances imply effects on
expected returns that are much larger (in absolute valt) than those reported
in Tables 3 and 4 —indeed,perhaps too large to be entirely credible.
Once again, however, the implied direction of these effects is in each
case identical to that reported in Tables 3and4.Financinggoverrutent
deficitsby issuing short-term debt lowers the return on long-term debt, and
lowers the return on equity by even more, in comparison to the return on
short-term debt. Financing deficits by issuing long—term debt raises the return
on long-term debt, and lowers the return on equity, again in comparison
to the return on short-term debt. In both cases the return on equity
falls in comparison to the return on either maturity of debt.—23—
V. Conclusions and Caveats
Howthe financing of government budget deficits affects the structure
of expected asset returns depends on assets' relative sabstitutabilitjes in
investors' aggregate portfolio, and these substitutabilities in turn depend
on how investors perceive the risks associated with the respective
asset returns. Increasing the siply that investors collectively must
hold of any asset raises that asset's market-clearing expected return.
By contrast, an increase in the supply of any one asset may either raise
or lower the expected return on any other asset.
The empirical results reported in this paper, based on three different
ways of representing investors' risk perceptions, consistently indicate
thatgovernment deficit financing raises expected debt returns relative
to expected equity returns, regardless of the maturity of the government
financing. MDrespecifically,financing government deficits by issuing
short—term debt lowers the return on long—term debt, and lowers the return
on equity by even more, relative to the return on short-term debt. Financing
deficits by issuing long-term debt raises the return on long-term debt, but
lciiersthe return on equity,again in coiarison to the return on short—
term debt. The indicated magnitudes of these effects differ according to
the method used to represent investors' risk perceptions, but the qualitative
resultsare consistent throughout. rbreover, many of the indicated magnitudes
are large enough to mattereconomically.21
Theseresults in1y that continuing large government deficits at full
employment lead to market incentives for individual business corporations
to emphasize reliance on equity(including retentions), and reduce reliance
ondebt, in comparison with the conosition of corporate financing that
would prevail in the absence of the need to finance the government budget
deficit. Because these results describe effects only on relative returns,—24—
ratherthan effects on absolute levels of returns,they answer questions
aboutthe composition of corporate financing but not about its total.
vertheless, in conjunction with some further assumption to anchor the
overall return structure —forexample, that monetary policy accommodates
the deficit so as to keep expected short-term real returns unchanged,
or, alternatively, that monetary policy is not accorrnodative and hence
letsexpected short—term real returns rise if the deficit is large
enough —theseresults also bear straightforward implications for the
volume of corporate financing and,inturn, corporate capital formation.
Finally, at least three caveats are potentially important in
evaluating these results. First, asthe discussion through this paper
hasrepeatedly emphasized, investors' perceptions of asset risk are not
directly observable. It is therefore necessary to usesomeoperational
procedureto represent them. It is significant that qualitatively identical
results follow from each of the three quite different procedures used
for this purpose here. Even so, no data—based procedure can ever represent
investors perceptions' perfectly, and each of the three procedures used
here may go astray in some way that matters importantly for the consequent
results.
The second caveat, also noted in the discussion above, is thatthe analysis
inthis paper focuses only on the financing effects associated with government
deficits.Thedeficitis just the difference between government expenditures
and tax revenues, however, and each has effects onnonfinancialeconomic
activity.When the economy's resources are less then fully employed,
greatereenditures and/or lower taxes stimulate real spending, incomes
and output. At full employment the chief result is inflation. In either—25—
casethe associated nonfinancial effects of government deficits typically
create indirect financial pressures that interact with the direct
financingeffects studied here.
The third caveat is that the analysis in this paper focuses only
onfinancial assets and,sincesome 90%of all borrowing by U.S. households
takes place to finance purchases of nonfinancial assets, ignores
households' liabilities. Not taking household liabilities into account
is probably not a major concern in the context of this paper's focus (it
could be in other contexts), but the omission of nonfinancial assets
potentially is. Whether two assets are close or distantsubstitutes can
depend importantly on what other assets are also inthe investor's portfolio,
or at least available for purchase. Moreover,nonfinancial assets bulk
large in households' aggregate portfolio. s of year—end1980, U.s.
households owned $2.8 trillion of residential real estate and $1.0trillion
ofconsumer durables —togethermore than the $3.5 trillion of financial
assetsshown in Table 1. Including these nonfinancial assets andtheir
returns in an analysis like that undertaken here is an important subjectfor
furtherresearch.Footnotes
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foruseful comments on and corrections to an earlier draft; and to the
National Bureau, the National Science Foundation, and the Alfred P. Sloan
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1.The Office of Management and Budget 's "Mid—Session view of the 1985
Budget,' published in August 1984, projects deficits (in billions) of
$172, $167, $166, $173, $160 and $139 for fiscal years 1984—89,
respectively. The Congressional Budget Office's "The Economic arid
Budget Outlook: n Update," also published in August 1984, projects
deficits (again in billions) of $174,$178,$195, $216, $238 and $263
forthe same series of years.
2.The U.S. economy's net private saving rate has been roughly steady at
about 7% of gross national product for decades.(Thus far during the
1980s it has averaged less than 6%, but this decline was probably a
result of the 1981—82 business recession.) The federal government
deficit averaged less than 1% of gross national product in the 195Os
and l96Os, and less than 2% in the 1970s.
3. See Friedman (1982) for a discussion of the long-run behavior of the
U.S.economy'sdebt—to-income ratio. The typical value for this ratiois a1xut 1.45. The ratio normally rises modestly during recession,
but the increase during 1981-82 was larger than usual. What has
been even more unusual about the mest recent business cycle is that
theratio did not promptly decline toward 1.45 during the recovery,
and the ratio still remained above 1.50 at midyear 1984. As of the
timeofwriting, it is too soon to determine whether this atypical
debt issuing behavior represents a lasting break from prior experience.
4. For a formal presentation of the ideas at issue here, see Friedman
(1978). The discussion both there and here is much in the spirit of
Tobin(1961, 1969).
5.It necessarily does so when all assets are (imperfect) substitutues in
investors' portfolios, and for plausible values of the relevant
parameters it maydoso even when some assets are complements.
6. See Friedman (forthcoming) for the details of the specific procedures
underlying the results summarized in this section.
7. The nominal returns associated with these real returns are zero for
Irney; a weighted-average yield for time and savings deposits; the
four-to—six month prime commercial paper yield for other short-term
debt;the Moody's Baa corporate bond yield, plus annualized percentage
capital gains or losses inferred by applying the consol pricing formula
to changes in the Baa yield, for long-term debt; and the dividend-price
yield, plus annualized percentage capital gains or losses on the
Standard and Poor's 500 index, for equity.
8. The marginal tax rates applied to interest and dividends are values
estimated by Estrella and Fuhrer (1983), on the basis of Internal
Revenue Service data, to reflect the marginal taxbracket of the average
recipientof these two respective kinds of income in each year. The
marginal tax rate applied to capital gains is an analogous estimate,including allowances for deferral and loss offset features, dueto
Feldstein et al. (1983).
9.The specific assumption made throughout this paper is that investors'
behavior exhibits constant relative risk aversion, with value equal to
four. Bodie et al. (forthcoming) also assumed constant relative
risk aversion equal to four. This value is about in the middle of
the range of available empirical estimates. (Friend and Blume (1975)
suggested a value in excess of two, Grossman and Shiller (1981)
suggested four, and Friend and Hasbrouck (1982) suggested six.) See
Friedman (forthcoming) for details of the calculations.
10. re precisely, the effects depend on issues by the Treasury less net
purchases by the Federal Reserve System.
11. See again the discussion in Section I, especially footnote 5.
12. SeeFriedman(1984) for the details of the specific procedures underlying
the results summarized in this section.
13. The first-order serial corilation coefficients are .86 for the short—
term debt return, .51 for the long-term debt return and .33 for the equity
return. Corresponding coefficients for inflation, bond capital gains and
equity capitals are .90, .44 and .31, respectively.
14. The values shown are the simple means of the variances and covariances
for each of the eight-four quarters.
15. The first Goldsmith-Nagan survey took place in September,1969. The
Livingston data are available for a much longer period. I am grateful
to Peter Nagan for providing his unpublished data for use inthis and
other research.
16.once again, as of the beginning of each period investors presumablyknow
the stated interest rates on short-term debt instruments, the currentprices and coupons on long—term debt instruments, and the current prices
and dividends on equity. For short-term debt and equity, the actual
returns here are the same as those analyzed in Sections II and III.
For long-term debt the return is based on the Ma utility rate used
inthe Coldsmith-Nagan survey,ratherthan on the Baa corporate rate
asin Sections II and III.
17.It is necessary to interpolate quarterly values of the inflation
andstock pr$ Ce expectations, because the Livingston survey asks
for six—month-ahead expectations twice per year.(The Goldsmith-
Nagan survey asks for three—month—ahead expectations four times
per year.)
18. The error variance for the return on long-term debt is dominated by
the sharp drop in the Ma (new iss) rate when credit controls were
imposedin 1980:11.(The Baa seasoned rate, used in Sections II and
III, fell only slightly in 1980:11). For the l969:IV-l980:IV period
omitting this one quarter, the corresponding error variance is 687.52.
19. The variances for 1969:IV-l980:IV, computed as in Table 3, are
(from upper left to lower right) 9.82, 293.90 and 763.33. The
corresponding variances conuted as in Table 4 are 1.54, 89.97 and
353.64.
20. alternative use of these survey data in this context would be to
use each period's dispersion of individual survey responses to proxy
that periods uncertainty. The potential shortcomings of assuming a
relationship between dispersion among different individuals' point
estimates and theuncertainty perceived by the representative individual
arewell known, however.
21. The magnitudes reported here are larger than those found by Frankel(forthcoming) in a study that in some respects parallelsthe work
described here. One source of this difference is thatFrankel assumed
a risk aversion value of two, insteadof fourasassumed here. inother
is that Frankel included tangible assets inhousehold wealth (while
still excluding all liabilities), instead of focusing onlyon financial
assets as here.Re ferences
Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, and McDonald, Robert. Forthcoming. Inflation and
the role of bondsininvestor portfolios. In Friedman, Benjamin
M., ed., Corporate capital structures in the United States. thicago:
University of icago Press.
Estrella, Arturo, and Fuhrer, Jeffrey. 1983. Average effective marginal
rates on interest anddividendincome in the United States,
1960-1979. National Bureau of Economic Research. Mimeographed.
Foldstein, Martin, Poterba, James, and Dicks-Mireau, Louis. 1983. The
effective tax rate and the pretax rate of return. Journal of
Public Economics, 21: 129—158.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. Forthcoming. A test of portfolio crowding-out and
other issues in finance. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Friedman, Benjamin N. 1978. Crowding out or crowding in? Economic
consequences of financing government deficits. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity: 593—641.
__________•1982.Debt and economic activity in the United States. In
Friedman,Benjamin N., ed., Thechangingroles of debt and equity
in financing U.S. capital formation. icago: University of
ChicagoPress.
__________•1984.Crowding out or crowding in? Evidence on debt-equity
substitutability. National Bureau of Economic Research. Mimeographed.
__________•Forthcoming.The substitutability of debt and equity securities.
In Friedman, Benjamin M., ed., Corporate capital structures in
the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Friend, Irwin, and Blume, Marshall E. 1975. The demand for risky assets.
American Economic Review, 65: 900—923.
_________andHasbrouck, Joe].. 1982. Effect of inflation on the
profitability and valuation of U.S. corporations. In M. Sarnat
and G. Szego, eds., Savings, investment and capital markets in
an inflationary economy. Cambridge: Ballinger.
Grossman, Sanford J., and Shiller, 8obert J. 1981. The determinants of
the variability of stock market prices. American Economic Review,
71: 222—227,
ibbin, James. 1961. Money, capital and other stores of value. American
Economic Review51:26-37.
_________1969.A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. Journal
of bney, Credit and BankinS, 1: 354-371.